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ABSTRACT
This paper is divided into three parts. I begin with a short history of the way American psychiatrists have defined mental disor-
der in general, and paraphilias (sexual perversions) in particular, from the 1950s to 2013. I look at how the different editions 
of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) have articulated (or in the case of the future DSM-5, will 
articulate) the distinction between health and disease. In the second part I suggest how psychiatrists might want to modify their 
approach to the definition of mental disorder. In the third part I explain why the paraphilias in particular should be removed 
from the current psychiatric classification of diseases. 
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RESUMEN
Este documento está dividido en tres partes.  Inicio con una breve historia de la forma en que psiquiatras americanos han 
definido el trastorno mental en general, y las parafilias (perversiones sexuales) en particular, entre 1950 y 2013.  Veo cómo 
las diferentes ediciones del Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM: Manual diagnóstico y estadístico de 
trastornos mentales) han articulado (o en el caso del futuro DSM-5, articularán) la distinción entre salud y enfermedad.  En 
la segunda parte sugiero cómo los psiquiatras querrían modificar su aproximación a la definición de trastorno mental.  En la 
tercera parte explico cómo las parafilias en particular deberían ser eliminadas de la actual clasificación de enfermedades. 
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What is disease? What is health? How 
do we draw the line between health and disease? Most of 
us never ask ourselves such abstract questions, perhaps 
because we trust that doctors know the answers, or 
perhaps because we simply do not see why we should care. 
Yet to officially grant the status of disease to a condition 
can be an act of tremendous social, cultural, political, 
economic, legal, and ultimately ethical importance. A 
new disease represents a new market opportunity for 
pharmaceuticals, it circumscribes a new area of research 
for scientists, it becomes a new source of fear and hope for 
patients, it can remove or lessen legal responsibility, it 
can make individuals lose their jobs or child custody, 
etc. More profoundly perhaps, new types of subjects are 
made possible by new diagnoses, for diagnoses carve 
out, in the fabric of human experience, distinct ways of 
being.1 In this paper I will look at how health is being 
separated from disease mostly by focusing on one specific 
example of disease: the sexual perversions, or as they are 
called today by American psychiatrists, the paraphilias. 
Why focus on the paraphilias? For a historical reason first: 
it is in the 1970s, during debates about the medical status 
of one specific paraphilia (homosexuality), that for the 
first time doctors, and especially psychiatrists, seriously 
1 For a detailed historico-philosophical example of this process of “ma-
king up people” through a diagnostic category, see Hacking (1995). 
tackled the problem of the definition of medical disorder. 
The paraphilias have thus played a particularly important 
role in the history of nosological thought. The second rea-
son is philosophical: paraphilia is one of the most contro-
versial medical categories still in use today, and therefore 
a perfect case study for the philosophical question, what 
is disease? A few scholars have argued that the paraphilias 
are not medical disorders, and in the last part of this paper 
I will also make an argument for the removal of all para-
philias from psychiatric classification of diseases. Finally, 
a political reason: in May 2013 the line between healthy 
sexuality and perversion will be officially redrawn in a very 
significant way –in a way that will result in many more 
people being labeled as “perverts”. People outside the psy-
chiatric profession need to be aware of this development if 
they want to be able to resist it better, and I hope that this 
paper will be a small contribution toward that goal. 
This political reason to focus on the paraphilias deter-
mined the type of approach I have decided to adopt for 
this paper. In several previous essays I have used the 
work of Michel Foucault as a springboard to study a va-
riety of historical objects, such as masturbation (Singy 
2003), sadism (Singy 2006a), or scientific observation 
(Singy 2006b). When it comes to the topics of sexual-
ity and psychiatry, I have in general found Foucault’s 
radical historical critique extremely inspiring, despite 
certain ambiguities (Lamb and Singy 2011). By showing 
the historical contingency of sexuality and psychiatry, 
Foucault invites us to question, and ultimately to get rid 
of, some of the most constraining categories that struc-
ture our modern experience. But such a strategic kind of 
resistance, which aims at overthrowing entire systems of 
thought, is not always feasible, nor necessarily desirable. 
A more targeted attack might be more appropriate when 
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one is dealing with a circumscribed source of oppression. 
Although it remains important to try to provide a radical 
critique of psychiatry, it seemed to me that the urgency of 
the problem discussed in this paper called for something 
more modest, and hopefully also more efficient –a tacti-
cal resistance. Consequently, the point of this paper is not 
to try to escape psychiatric power/knowledge altogether, 
but by using the tools of analytic philosophy, to lay bare 
some of its internal conceptual weaknesses and to offer a 
reflection on how to make it less pernicious. 
Defining Mental Disorder
The history of the definition of mental disorder in the 
USA is tied to the history of the Diagnostic and Statisti-
cal Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). The DSM, of which 
the next edition is due out in May 2013, is the official 
American classification of psychiatric diseases. In this 
manual each psychiatric disease is described in the 
form of a list of symptoms. People qualify for a diag-
nosis if they have a minimum number of these symp-
toms. For instance, someone is a pathological gambler 
if he/she suffers from five out of ten symptoms, which 
among others include “needs to gamble with increas-
ing amounts of money in order to achieve the desired 
excitement,” “lies to family members, therapist, or 
others to conceal the extent of involvement with gam-
bling,” and “has committed illegal acts such as forgery, 
fraud, theft, or embezzlement to finance gambling” 
(American Psychiatric Association 2000, 674). To give 
a diagnosis with the DSM is a fairly simple procedure 
–and that is precisely the point. Armed with the DSM, 
psychiatrists should be able to agree with one an-
other, since the DSM shuns theoretical disputes and 
focuses only on symptoms that are easily ascertain-
able.2 Transparent throughout the DSM is an ideal of 
2 See these pages: 155-7, 225-8, 248-9, 253. Needless to say, the atheoreti-
cal stance of the DSM leads to an epistemological impasse. As Dominic 
Murphy (2006) rightly argues, there are “obvious drawbacks to a caus-
ally neutral taxonomy of malfunctions that does not take into account 
information about normal functioning. … Imagine how the state of 
health care would be if somatic medicine limited itself to symptoms 
in this way: we would classify together everyone who coughs as suffer-
ers from ‘cough disorder’ and thereby miss the fact that someone who 
coughs may be doing so for a number of very different reasons. She may 
just have something lodged in her throat, or be irritated by the smoky 
atmosphere in Rudy’s Bar and Grill. Or she may be suffering from a 
variety of pathological conditions, including TB, bronchitis, or pulmo-
nary edema. It is, to say the least, undesirable to fail to distinguish 
all these different causes of coughing, yet that is the result of relying 
exclusively on clinical phenomenology. Notice that ‘cough disorder’ 
could be a very reliable diagnosis in the technical sense of conducive to 
agreement among observers” (Murphy 2006, 311-12). 
mechanical objectivity, born in reaction against the 
complex and subjective hermeneutic method of psy-
choanalysis, and in part inspired by computer science 
(Demazeux 2011).3 
The scientific and cultural importance of the DSM 
cannot be overstated. Psychiatrists have to rely on it 
for insurance purposes, for instance. It is also crucial for 
research: since all American psychiatrists rely on this 
same book to diagnose diseases, they can compare how 
different cures work on one disease, how rare or com-
mon a disease is, how it evolves, etc.4 The DSM is often 
referred to as the “Bible of psychiatry” –and that says it 
all: it is the reference book for American psychiatrists. 
The publication of the DSM-III in 1980 marked a revolu-
tion in the history of the DSM. One of the most visible 
changes was the increase in the number of mental dis-
orders: from 182 disorders in the DSM-II of 1968, to 265 
disorders in the DSM-III (the current DSM-IV-TR lists 297 
disorders). This nosological proliferation is of course 
not due to some sudden and mysterious degeneration 
of the human species, but to a combination of more 
mundane factors. To begin with, the psychiatrists 
in charge of the DSM-III followed what they called 
the “fundamental principle [of] inclusiveness”: “in 
order to maximize its clinical utility, DSM-III should 
include –with only a few exceptions– all widely used 
diagnostic categories that clinicians find essential to 
their work, even if satisfactory reliability and valid-
ity data are lacking” (Spitzer and Williams 1994, 459). 
In the name of clinical utility, there has been a ten-
dency to bring many out-of-the-ordinary conditions 
into the purview of the DSM. In addition (but this is 
mostly true for the DSMs after the DSM-III, starting 
with the DSM-III-R of 1987), psychiatrists have often 
been pressured by outside groups, such as pharmaceu-
tical companies, to increase the number of disorders 
or to expand the territory that they cover (Demazeux 
2011). Finally, and this is crucial for my argument, the 
3 Interestingly, since the DSM-IV the American Psychiatric Associa-
tion has stressed on the contrary the importance of clinical judg-
ment: “It is important that DSM-IV not be applied mechanically by 
untrained individuals. The specific diagnostic criteria included in 
DSM-IV are meant to serve as guidelines to be informed by clinical 
judgment and are not meant to be used in a cookbook fashion” (Ame-
rican Psychiatric Association 1994, xxiii). See Demazeux (2011).
4 However, at the same time that it facilitates comparisons, the 
DSM’s exclusive focus on symptoms undermines scientific re-
search by separating diseases that might be symptomatically di-
fferent but nomologically similar, or vice-versa. See Poland, Von 
Eckardt and Spaulding (1994).
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DSM does not have a solid definition of mental disor-
der that could have curtailed the expansion of what 
it calls disorders. If one does not really know how to 
distinguish a mental disorder from a perhaps unfortu-
nate character trait (for instance, social phobia from 
shyness), then the boundary between them can very 
quickly become fuzzy. 
The DSM’s strength is in the clarity and simplicity of 
its descriptions. But it is much weaker when it comes 
to justifying why in the first place social phobia, patho-
logical gambling, the paraphilias, or any other diag-
nostic category, must be considered disorders.5 In fact, 
in the first two DSMs the concept of “mental disorder” 
was not even defined. The assumption probably was 
that you know a mental disorder when you see one. 
The same assumption was also clearly at work with spe-
cific disorders. The “sexual deviations,” for instance, 
were listed but not defined in the DSM-I (American 
Psychiatric Association 1952), and they were very unsci-
entifically and intuitively identified as any kind of non-
heterosexual or “bizarre” sexual interest in the DSM-II 
(American Psychiatric Association 1968).6
In the 1960s and 1970s, this cavalier approach became ir-
ritating to homosexuals, who no longer accepted being de-
scribed as sick individuals. The concept of homosexuality 
was invented in the nineteenth century, and while from 
the middle of the nineteenth century on a small minor-
ity of people thought that being homosexual was a natural 
way of being –just as natural as being heterosexual– most 
people, and especially psychiatrists, thought that homo-
sexuality was a disease. In the mid-twentieth century, 
with the sexual revolution, the opinion started to shift, 
and gays began to organize and fight for their rights. They 
went to conventions of the American Psychiatric Associa-
tion to let psychiatrists know that they wanted homosexu-
ality to be removed from the DSM. Some psychiatrists also 
became critical of their own profession’s attitude toward 
homosexuals. In the end, the question of whether ho-
mosexuality is a mental disorder or not was put to a vote. 
After many debates, in 1973 58% of psychiatrists decided 
that it should be removed from the DSM (Bayer 1987).
The psychiatrist who has been mostly responsible for 
the removal of homosexuality from the DSM is Robert 
5 As many critiques have noted, the DSM favors reliability over validi-
ty. See Horwitz (2002). 
6 The DSM-III still referred to the paraphilias as “bizarre”; the term 
was finally omitted in the DSM-III-R. See Frances and First (2011).
L. Spitzer. What Spitzer did in the 1970s with the DSM-
III was to offer a definition of mental disorder that en-
abled him on the one hand to include many conditions 
that were uncontroversially thought to be diseases, 
and on the other hand to exclude homosexuality, 
which a majority of psychiatrists no longer wanted to 
consider pathological. Although it would be interest-
ing to parse in detail Spitzer’s original definition of 
mental disorder, and although several small changes 
have been made to the definition between the DSM-III 
and today’s DSM-IV-TR, it is clear that there has been 
an unchanging core of the definition, which I would 
state as follows: from the DSM-III until the DSM-IV-
TR, a mental disorder has been defined as a harmful dys-
function. Something is a disorder if and only if it is at 
the same time a dysfunction and a cause of harm. This 
definition is meant to cover not just mental disorders 
but any medical disorder. 
Let us see how the definition is supposed to work, 
with three examples. Is a heart attack a disorder? Ac-
cording to the definition, the answer is clearly “yes”: 
it is a dysfunction (it disturbs the function of the 
heart, which is to pump blood), and it causes harm. Is 
homosexuality a disorder? No, because while it might 
be dysfunctional (if we assume that the function of 
sex is reproduction –more on this point below), it is 
not harmful. Homosexuals are often well-adjusted in-
dividuals who do not suffer from their condition per se. 
Since only one of the two necessary conditions of the 
definition is met (the dysfunction prong of the defini-
tion), homosexuality does not qualify as a disorder. 
Finally, is teething a disorder? It can be very harmful, 
but it is a natural process, so it is not dysfunctional. 
Once again, since only one of the two necessary condi-
tions is met (this time, the harmful prong of the defini-
tion), teething is not a disorder.
With his definition of disorder as harmful dysfunc-
tion, Spitzer managed to remove homosexuality from 
the DSM without entirely challenging the validity of the 
rest of the disorders. The definition could in principle 
also serve as a conceptual test that conditions have to 
pass in order to be included in the DSM. This was es-
pecially important given the cultural context of the 
1970s. At the time, the anti-psychiatry movement 
was accusing psychiatry of bringing support to the re-
gimes around the world that were trying to oppress 
sexual, racial, and political minorities. To Spitzer’s 
credit, he took this accusation seriously. He under-
stood that psychiatry needed to rely on a definition 
of mental disorder that would block, or at least make 
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difficult, the direct translation of social deviance into 
mental disorder.7
And yet, the DSM definition of mental disorder has re-
mained toothless, mostly because it does not specify 
what dysfunction means. Here is a well-known example 
that illustrates how the lack of a specification of dysfunc-
tion can have very troublesome consequences. In 1851, 
Dr. Samuel A. Cartwright described a condition that he 
called “drapetomania,” a disease that made slaves try to 
flee captivity (Cartwright 1851). Is drapetomania a real dis-
ease? If we apply the DSM’s current definition of mental 
disorder, the answer might very well be “yes,” depending 
on how we interpret dysfunction. Indeed, slaves who try to 
escape from their masters do not “function” in a racist so-
ciety: they are socially dysfunctional. And they harm their 
masters by depriving them of their property. 
The idea that a slave who tries to escape from his mas-
ter does not function in a racist society is obviously very 
different from the idea that the heart does not function 
when it is having a heart attack. In the example of drap-
etomania, dysfunction is no longer a biological or psy-
chological concept, but a socio-cultural one. The DSM 
does not clearly distinguish between these two types 
of dysfunction, and without this distinction nothing 
stops psychiatry from becoming exactly what anti-psy-
chiatrists have for decades accused it of being: a mere 
instrument of social control. Spitzer’s response to the 
anti-psychiatry critique only plays hide and seek with 
the thorny problem of values. The criterion of dysfunc-
tion gives an air of objective rigor to Spitzer’s definition 
of mental disorder, seemingly making it less dependant 
upon socio-cultural values. But because dysfunction can 
in fact be interpreted in a socio-cultural manner, its ob-
jectivity is more illusory than real. Prejudices can thus 
hide behind a veil of objectivity. 
Because of this dangerous ambiguity in the current defi-
nition of mental disorder, some of the psychiatrists who 
in the past have been in charge of the DSM, such as, quite 
recently, Spitzer himself, have begun to push for a stricter 
understanding of dysfunction (Spitzer 1999; Wakefield 
and First 2003).8 They have usually relied on the influen-
tial work of Jerome Wakefield, who also speaks in terms of 
7 The 1970s philosophical debate about the nature of health and disea-
se was in great part motivated by a fear of what Christopher Boorse 
called the “psychiatric turn,” i.e., the “strong tendency … to debate 
social issues in psychiatric terms” (Boorse 1975, 49).
8 Michael B. First was the Editor of the DSM-IV-TR.
harmful dysfunction but with a crucial precision regard-
ing dysfunction (Wakefield 1992a; Wakefield 1992b). Ac-
cording to Wakefield, a function should be understood as a 
mechanism selected by evolution. For instance, the heart makes 
a beating noise and it pumps blood. But making noise 
is not the function of the heart, whereas pumping 
blood is. Why? Because, as Wakefield explains, “it is 
the pumping, and not the sound, that explains why we 
have hearts and why hearts are structured as they are” 
(Wakefield 1992a, 236). The same holds true for psychologi-
cal or behavioral characteristics. For instance, fear might 
have the evolutionary function of making you better pre-
pared to face possible dangers. When you are afraid, your 
senses are heightened, you no longer feel pain, hunger 
or thirst, all your attention is concentrated on the danger 
and on how to avoid it. Seen from this evolutionary per-
spective, someone who is afraid when there is absolutely 
no danger has a dysfunctional type of fear and might suf-
fer from a form of pathological phobia.
The theory of evolution is thus meant to ground the 
concept of mental disorder in biological and psychologi-
cal science, and to make it less directly dependent on 
socio-cultural values. Now we can say, for instance, that 
Cartwright’s drapetomania is not only revolting by mod-
ern cultural standards (we hope), but also scientifically 
wrong. From an evolutionary point of view, trying to run 
away from an oppressor is certainly not dysfunctional.
Today the DSM still relies on Spitzer’s original definition 
of disorder (with a few minor changes), but several in-
fluential psychiatrists have lately endorsed Wakefield’s 
more precise proposal and suggested it should be used for 
the future DSM-5. Will the DSM-5 follow this suggestion? 
Apparently not. In 2010 the psychiatrists working on 
the DSM-5 made available online their proposals for the 
future DSM (see www.dsm5.org). What very clearly 
transpires from these proposals is that instead of try-
ing to strengthen the definition of mental disorder in order 
to make psychiatry less dependent upon socio-cultural 
values, the DSM-5 is about to undermine both the crite-
rion of harm and the criterion of dysfunction. That is, 
the DSM-5 is ready to open the gates to conditions that 
are neither harmful nor dysfunctional.
This trend is especially clear with the paraphilias.9 Let 
us look at the problem of dysfunction first. Instead of 
9 This paragraph and the three following ones are adapted from 
Singy (2010).
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appealing to a Wakefieldian concept of dysfunction 
grounded in evolutionary theory, or even of continu-
ing to use Spitzer’s well-intentioned but deficient defi-
nition, the people working on the DSM-5 shamelessly 
embrace the criteria of cultural abnormality and so-
cial deviance. For them, a pervert, to put it simply, is 
someone who is weird: “Paraphilias are characterized 
by persistent, socially anomalous or deviant sexual 
arousal” (American Psychiatric Association 2011).
It is as if the people who are responsible for the para-
philia section of the future DSM-5 had not learned 
anything from what happened with homosexuality 
in the 1970s. Gay activists in the 1970s forced psychia-
trists to realize that being different is not the same 
as being sick. They forced psychiatrists to articulate 
a definition of mental disorder that would block the 
all-too-common association between being outside 
the cultural norm and having a psychiatric disease. 
What the DSM-5 is about to do is to give up completely 
on that effort, and to reduce paraphilias to whatever 
culture says is an abnormal sexual interest. 
But it gets worse. As if reducing the dysfunction cri-
terion to cultural disapproval were not problematic 
enough (both scientifically and ethically), the people 
working on the DSM-5 are also trying to undermine 
the critical importance of the harm criterion. If they 
succeed, a “harmless paraphilia” would no longer 
be an oxymoron: people who enjoy sex in a way that 
harms no one, yet happens to be outside the cultural 
norm, would now have a paraphilia and would find 
their place in the DSM-5. By contrast, remember that 
since the DSM-III, for a condition to be considered a 
paraphilia it was necessarily harmful. The DSM-5’s 
removal of the harm criterion signifies that homo-
sexuality could in principle be reinserted in a future 
edition of the DSM.
We are heading toward an epidemic of perverts. Starting 
in May 2013, when the DSM-5 is due out, Americans will 
be considered sexual perverts if what they enjoy sexu-
ally is outside the norm. It will not matter if it is func-
tional or dysfunctional, and it will not matter whether 
it causes harm or not. What the DSM-5 is about to do is 
nothing less than to pathologize difference. 
Redefining Mental Disorder
How can we try to resist this obvious encroachment of 
psychiatric power on our freedoms? The most radical 
move would probably be to dismiss psychiatric knowl-
edge altogether. Given how ingrained psychiatry has 
become in our society, this dismissal is obviously not 
very realistic. Short of such a radical approach, what 
more limited but also more effective tactic could we use 
to resist the conclusions of the future DSM-5? 
The first step is perhaps to recognize that when it 
comes to psychiatry, the only thing more dangerous 
than a bad definition of mental disorder is no defini-
tion at all. Unfortunately, after Spitzer’s effort to try to 
define mental disorder there has been a lack of concern 
for this issue among most psychiatrists. Allen Frances, 
who was Spitzer’s successor in charge of developing the 
DSM-IV, recently claimed that “there is no definition of 
a mental disorder. It’s bullshit. I mean, you just can’t 
define it” (quoted in Greenberg 2010).
Yet few people should feel more concerned than Fran-
ces about trying to give a definition of mental disor-
der. Frances has become one of the fiercest and most 
influential critiques of the future DSM-5.10 He warns 
that the DSM-5 will lead to false positive diagnoses, for 
instance by indicating that some people are paraphili-
acs when really they are not. But how can he say that 
some people are not paraphiliacs, if he does not know 
what paraphilia in particular, or mental disorder in 
general, is? The very idea of false positive requires that 
you have a point of reference against which you can 
compare a case and conclude that an apparent posi-
tive is in fact a false positive. If you do not know what 
a mental disorder is, and if you think that matters of 
definition are “bullshit,” then it is frankly disingenu-
ous to accuse the DSM-5 of leading to false positive 
diagnoses. With his nonchalant, atheoretical, and 
dismissive attitude toward the question of the defini-
tion of mental disorder, Frances undermines his own 
criticism of the DSM-5. His debate with the DSM-5 is 
similar to a debate between two people who disagree 
about which ice cream flavor is best. More problem-
atically, by framing the debate in these subjective 
terms, he indirectly supports the DSM-5’s general ap-
proach to nosology at the same time that he attacks its 
specific conclusions.11
10 See his blog at http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/dsm5-in-dis-
tress.
11 For instance, Ray Blanchard (2010) defines a paraphilia simply as 
something “abnormal” and argues for the insertion of “hebephilia” 
in the DSM-5. Frances (Frances and First 2011, 80) argues on the con-
trary that “hebephilia” should not be inserted in the DSM-5, on the 
ground that it is not “bizarre.” Both Blanchard and Frances thus use 
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What definition of mental disorder should we adopt? 
There are three main camps regarding this issue: the 
naturalists, who believe that disease and health can be 
defined objectively, on empirical grounds; the norma-
tivists, who argue that what we call disease and health 
are nothing more than the reflections of value judg-
ments; and finally, the position that is probably most 
common, and to which Wakefield and many others 
belong: the hybrids, i.e., those who think that disease 
and health are concepts that refer to facts of nature and 
to human values.. 
The naturalist position seems to me to be clearly unten-
able. A value component exists in all concepts of dis-
order. We say that cancer is a disease because we value 
life, for instance. The normativist position seems much 
more plausible theoretically, but it can have dangerous 
consequences. From a normativist perspective one can 
claim that being interested in Michel Foucault, not be-
lieving in God, or fleeing from a master are all patho-
logical conditions, for instance. There would be no 
ground upon which to rest in order to challenge these 
opinions. De gustibus non est disputandum. When Foucault 
was diagnosed with AIDS, at a time when AIDS was not 
well known, his friend Paul Veyne asked him whether 
“AIDS exists really or whether it is only a moralizing 
myth.” Foucault replied: “I’ve studied this question, 
I’ve read quite a few things about it, and yes, it exists, 
it is not a myth. American physicians have studied this 
closely” (Veyne 2008, 211). This kind of basic distinction 
between real and mythical disease is something that 
I think we should try to preserve, not only because it 
intuitively makes sense (without it the very concept of 
disease becomes nonsensical) (see Murphy 2006, 23-29), 
but also because it can serve as a barrier against the ex-
pansion of psychiatric power in our modern societies. 
So I subscribe to a hybrid position –disease and health 
are concepts that have both an empirical basis and a 
value component. But which empirical basis and which 
value component? This is where problems arise, of 
course. Regarding the empirical basis, I find Wake-
field’s evolutionary approach attractive, but for a very 
perverse reason. Instead of helping doctors draw the 
line between disease and health, evolutionary theory 
would often make this task more arduous, and might 
therefore force them to take seriously the provisory 
nature of most of their diagnostic categories. In prac-
subjective criteria (abnormality, bizarreness), but what is bizarre/
abnormal for one is not so for the other.
tice, it is indeed often very difficult to know the natural 
function of something. 
Take something as basic as sex. Here is what Spitzer 
wrote, in an article co-authored with Wakefield: “One 
does not need knowledge of evolutionary theory to rec-
ognize that the function of sexual attraction is to facili-
tate selection of fertile mates and behavior that leads 
to reproduction” (Spitzer and Wakefield 2002, 499). And 
here is what Spitzer wrote in another article: “Why do 
we have sexual arousal? It is obvious. Sexual arousal 
brings people together to have that interpersonal sex. 
Sexual arousal has the function of facilitating pair 
bonding which is facilitated by reciprocal affectionate 
relationships” (Spitzer 2005, 114). Those are of course 
two completely different statements about the function 
of sex, and this striking discrepancy illustrates how it 
is often quite difficult to identify a natural function 
with certainty. 
Some practitioners have rejected Wakefield’s definition 
of mental disorder on the ground that it is often un-
workable (Bolton 2008). But that is precisely the reason 
why I like it. If implemented, it would force psychia-
trists to be much more skeptical about their diagnoses. 
Making the concept of disorder dependent on evolu-
tionary theory would mean that it would be harder, not 
easier, to know what a disorder is, and this might in-
ject a healthy and much needed dose of skepticism into 
the practice of psychiatry. 
I should add, however, that I myself might be suffer-
ing from “naïvism,” if such a disease existed. Instead 
of fostering intellectual debates and skepticism, as I 
would hope, the fact that the evolutionary function of 
a behavior remains often indeterminate could very well 
encourage psychiatrists to use the theory of evolution 
to reinforce pre-existing prejudices.12 Wakefield him-
self has had a pattern of running to the rescue of the 
DSM by claiming that such and such DSM category re-
fers to an evolutionary dysfunction, even when no solid 
evidence could back up this claim.13 There is obviously 
12 For a general critique of evolutionary psychology and of its uses, see 
Kitcher (1985) and Dupré (2001). 
13 See for instance Wakefield: “We do not have to know the details of 
evolution or of internal mechanisms to know … that typical cases of 
thought disorder, drug dependence, mood disorders, sexual dysfunc-
tion, insomnia, anxiety disorders, learning disorders, and so on, are 
failures of some mechanisms to perform their designed functions; it 
is obvious from surface features” (Wakefield 1997, 256). For a criticism 
of Wakefield on this point, see Demazeux (2010); Murphy (2006 and 
2011). See also Demazeux’s similar criticism of Boorse in Demazeux 
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a very difficult balancing act to do between advocating 
the use of a biological theory for the sake of limiting 
the number of possible disorders, and warding off the 
pernicious effects that this same theory might have be-
cause of its inconclusive results. I am not quite ready to 
give up on the idea that the difference between health 
and disease can be partly determined empirically, but I 
must admit that I am not sure how to go about resolv-
ing this problem. 
Regarding the value aspect of disease, I think the most 
urgent task for psychiatrists is to make their values ex-
plicit (Fulford 2002). For instance, if psychiatrists want 
to continue making fetishism into a disorder, they 
need to lay out the notion of sexuality that they value to 
justify the validity of this diagnosis. I am quite certain 
that once the values behind psychiatric diagnoses are 
out in the open, some of the DSM diagnoses will lose 
much of the aura of scientificity that they still have 
today in the lay public. It would become clearly visible, 
for instance, that the psychiatrists who are dealing 
with the paraphilias rely on traditional values that are 
out-of-sync with those of modern liberal societies.
The distinction between health and disease is a philo-
sophically complex and abstract problem, and my preced-
ing tentative and very brief remarks are not meant to solve 
it, only to stir the conversation in a certain direction. I am 
convinced of only one thing: because receiving a diagnosis 
can have important social and existential consequences, 
psychiatrists should be very careful about not blurring 
too much the line between disease and health. Unfor-
tunately, instead of continuing and pushing further the 
debate about the nature of mental disorder, the DSM-5 
seems eager to go back to the callous, paternalistic and 
theoretically immature approach of the DSM-I and DSM-
II –an approach which, phenomenologically, is probably 
rooted in a visceral reaction of disgust against those who 
are different, and which, historically, has too often made 
psychiatry the servant of oppressive powers.
Erasing Perversion
As I explained above, it would be illusory to try to 
throw the entirety of psychiatry overboard. But when 
(2011). John Z. Sadler rightly remarks that Wakefield’s early work 
was more prescriptive than it is today: “It appears [Wakefield] has 
gone from evaluating categories for assignment of disorder status to 
explaining, post hoc, why the status quo is the status quo” (Sadler 
1999, 434).
it comes to sexual perversions, we can show that, 
even when judged from within the epistemological 
field of modern psychiatry, the diagnosis of paraphilia 
is questionable, to say the least. In this final section of 
my paper I would like to explain why all the paraphilias 
should be removed from the DSM, without challeng-
ing the usefulness or validity of psychiatry itself, or 
even of the DSM. In order to make my argument I need 
first to make a detour through the history of the con-
cept of perversion. 
All the terms that refer to sexual perversions, includ-
ing the expression “sexual perversion” itself, have been 
invented in the second half of the nineteenth century, 
usually by German psychiatrists. The emergence of this 
new lexical field is the symptom of an entirely new way 
of thinking about sex, which we call “sexuality” (also 
a nineteenth-century word). It is crucial to stress that 
psychiatrists began to talk about sadism, homosexu-
ality, exhibitionism, fetishism, etc., not in a clinical 
context, but in a forensic one. What these first psychi-
atrists were concerned with was not helping patients 
in distress, but determining whether defendants were 
responsible for crimes.
For instance, the first important case of perversion 
dates from 1849 and was about a French soldier who 
had sex with corpses and tore them to pieces: the sergeant 
François Bertrand. The question that was asked during 
his trial was: did this man voluntarily desecrate corpses, 
or was he driven by an irresistible instinct? (Anonymous 
1849). Psychiatrists thought that since he was young, 
good-looking and intelligent, if he had wanted he 
could have had sex with living women (Brierre de Bois-
mont 1849; Baillarger 1858). The only possible explana-
tion for his behavior was therefore, according to these 
psychiatrists, that he suffered from a perversion of the 
sexual instinct.
A few years later the same type of question was raised 
about people who had sex with people of the same 
sex. This time it took place in Germany rather than 
in France, because sodomy was illegal in Germany 
but not in France. German psychiatrists determined 
that some people simply cannot help desiring people 
of the same sex. It is not a choice: it is part of their 
nature; they are a different kind of people than nor-
mal people. And so they were called “homosexuals.” 
Because homosexuality was thought to be a disease 
rather than a choice, psychiatrists argued that homo-
sexuals should not be deemed legally responsible for 
the crime of sodomy.
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All the paraphilias that have ended up in the DSM have 
a similar forensic origin.14 It is always the same pat-
tern: a crime is committed –rape, sodomy, exhibition-
ism, etc. –and then the issue of responsibility is raised: 
did the defendant commit this crime voluntarily, or 
could he not have helped himself because it was part 
of his nature? Today it is still within a forensic context 
that new paraphilias are created. For instance, lately 
there has been a fierce debate about “hebephilia,” a 
paraphilia characterized by sexual attraction to pubes-
cent children. “Hebephilia” is not in the current DSM-
IV-TR, but there is pressure for it to be included in the 
future DSM-5, since it is in fact already used by some 
forensic psychiatrists in the courtroom (Blanchard et al. 
2009).15 Today, just like in the nineteenth century, the 
paraphilias are born in the courtroom, not on the couch.
The fact that the paraphilias have a forensic origin in-
dicates that what is fundamentally at stake in a diag-
nosis of paraphilia is the issue of self-control. Think 
of the two situations in which the diagnosis of para-
philia plays an important forensic role: the insanity 
defense and the civil commitment under the Sexually 
Violent Predator (SVP) laws.16 In the case of an in-
sanity defense the forensic psychiatrist who claims 
that a person suffers from a paraphilia implies that 
this person is not legally responsible because he lacks 
self-control. In the case of a paraphiliac who is civilly 
committed under the Sexually Violent Predator laws, 
the assumption is that this person will not be able 
to control himself if released into society, just like a 
wild beast cannot help but kill. For this reason, after 
these paraphiliacs have completed their sentence in 
prison they must be kept in an institution that will try 
to cure them of their paraphilia, and that will above 
all protect society. In the case of the insanity defense, 
the question of self-control is directed toward the 
past, while in the case of civil commitment it is di-
rected toward the future –but in both cases what is at 
stake is self-control. When forensic experts are being 
asked, “Does this person suffer from a paraphilia?” 
14 Frances and First seem unaware of this historical background. For this 
reason they do not realize that their criticism against the inclusion of 
hebephilia in the DSM-5 should logically apply to all the other para-
philias as well: “The alleged diagnosis ‘paraphilia not otherwise 
specified, hebephilia’, arose, not out of psychiatry, but rather to 
meet a perceived need in the correctional system. This solution rep-
resents a misuse of the diagnostic system and of psychiatry” (Frances 
and First 2011). 
15 For a criticism of the hebephilia diagnosis, see for instance Franklin 
(2010) and Wakefield (2011).
16 On the SVP laws, see Janus (2009).
what they are really being asked is, “Does this person 
lack, did s/he lack, or will s/he lack self-control?” In 
the courtroom, the assumption is that if you have a 
paraphilia, you lack self-control. 
But over the course of the twentieth century, the con-
cept of paraphilia has been extracted from its original 
forensic context and used in clinical settings. Clini-
cal psychiatrists were no longer interested in the fo-
rensic issue of self-control. In the paraphilia section 
of today’s DSM, lack of self-control is indeed not a 
necessary condition for something to count as a para-
philia. For instance, someone who has always been able 
to resist his urge to molest children, but is distressed by 
the fact that he has this urge, qualifies for a diagnosis 
of pedophilia. In its Introduction, the DSM warns very 
explicitly that “the fact that an individual’s presentation 
meets the criteria for a DSM-IV diagnosis does not carry 
any necessary implication regarding the individual’s 
degree of control over the behaviors that may be as-
sociated with the disorder” (American Psychiatric As-
sociation 2000, xxxiii).17 What matters in a clinical 
setting is to alleviate the suffering of patients, not to 
determine whether they have self-control or not. 
There is obviously room here for some very dangerous con-
fusion. Lawyers use the paraphilia diagnoses of the DSM 
to imply that a person lacks self-control, while the 
DSM claims that you can have a paraphilia without lacking 
self-control. The same diagnosis of paraphilia turns out 
to mean something different in a medical context than it 
does in a legal one.18 From a forensic perspective, it would 
certainly be much more appropriate to ask directly whether 
a defendant lacks self-control than to ask whether he has a 
paraphilia, because the latter question is only an indirect 
and misleading way to get at the former question, which 
is the only one that matters forensically. Since the DSM 
claims that having a paraphilia is neither a sufficient nor 
a necessary condition for lacking self-control, there is no 
forensic reason for the paraphilias to remain in the DSM. 
17 Winick rightly notes that “the language in DSM-IV describing even 
the impulse control disorders and sexual disorders –conditions invol-
ving repetitive criminal and sometimes violent behavior– suggests a 
failure on the part of the individual to resist strong impulses or ur-
ges, rather than an inability to do so” (Winick 1995, 579).
18 This problem is not restricted to the diagnosis of paraphilia but 
affects the category of mental disorder as a whole. As Michael S. Mo-
ore has shown, “writers in the area of legal insanity have often been 
confused between two quite distinct concepts: legal insanity and 
mental illness” (Moore 1980, 30). See also Murphy (2006); Neu (1980); 
Winick (1995). 
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Would there be at least a clinical reason for keeping 
the paraphilias in the DSM? If a fetishist is miserable, 
for instance, shouldn’t psychiatrists try to cure him 
of his fetishism? Can’t a diagnosis of paraphilia make 
clinical sense in some cases? But here we need to ask 
ourselves: what exactly does this fetishist suffer from? 
Compare with an anorexic: the anorexic clearly suffers 
from her condition; in fact she might die from it. But 
if paraphiliacs suffer, it is not because of their sexual 
preference per se. It is because of how people react to 
their sexual preference. For instance, it is of course 
very possible that a homosexual would suffer from de-
pression, and that it would not be the case if he were 
heterosexual. But depression is not caused by homo-
sexuality itself; it is caused by the discrimination 
that a homosexual might feel in a homophobic soci-
ety. Homosexuality is not the problem: the problem 
is society’s reaction to homosexuality. The situation is 
analogous to African-Americans who are depressed as 
a result of living in a racist environment, or to women 
who are depressed as a result of living in a misogy-
nistic environment (Moser and Kleinplatz 2005). Psy-
chiatrists might want to help African-Americans and 
women with their depression, but they will not try 
to cure them of their race or womanhood. The same 
should hold true for paraphiliacs, and this is why the 
inclusion of the paraphilias in the DSM makes no more 
sense clinically than it does forensically. 
For centuries the adjudication of sex has been keep-
ing moralists, theologians and politicians very busy. It 
is perhaps understandable that since the second half 
of the nineteenth century psychiatrists have wanted 
their share of what has turned out to be, after all, 
excellent business. But inasmuch as they conceive of 
their discipline as a modern science, psychiatrists need 
to subject themselves to much higher standards of the-
oretical coherence. The current psychiatric thinking on 
perversion is so deeply flawed –so deeply perverted, one 
might say– that I fail to see how it could be salvaged. 
Nor can I think of any reason why it should be. 
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